Works associated with Han Fei discuss laws, techniques of government, and ruling authority. They attempt to explain why governing cannot depend only on a monarch's personal morality.
Parables are one method used in the arguments. Questions about the texts' formation and later editing require readers to distinguish the author's life from the full contents of the transmitted book.
Title and transmission
The Han Feizi was originally simply named the Hanzi (Master Han). The title was expanded to Han Feizi during the Tang dynasty, possibly to avoid confusion with the Confucian poet Han Yu. Not including critical edition commentary, it appears to have always been considered properly the same length of 55 p'ien since the time of its listing in the Hanshu's catalogue. A few sources list it as one p'ien longer, but was likely just copyist error. There are slightly shorter editions, but these did not have serious losses, and went out of print inside China after it was restored to full length.
Two of the text's Laozi commentaries, 20-21, have generally been considered addendums due to "considerable ideological, lexical, and stylistic differences". This says nothing as to the date of their authorship or addition however, with no chapter demonstrating knowledge of Qin unification.
Introduction
Han Fei describes an interest-driven human nature together with the political methodologies to work with it in the interest of the state and Sovereign, namely, engaging in passive observation, and the systematic use of fa ('law'', ''measurement') to maintain leadership and manage human resources, its use to increase welfare, and its relation with justice.
Rather than rely too much on worthies, who might not be trustworthy, Han Fei binds their programs to systematic reward and penalty (the 'two handles'), fishing the subjects of the state by feeding them with interests. That being done, the ruler minimizes his own input, intending to make no judgement apart from observances of the facts. Like Shang Yang and other fa philosophers, he admonishes the ruler not to abandon fa for any other means, considering it a more practical means for the administration of both a large territory and personnel near at hand.
Performance and title (Xing-Ming)
Han Fei was notoriously focused on what he termed xing-ming, which Sima Qian and Liu Xiang define as "holding actual outcome accountable to ming (speech)." In line with both the Confucian and Mohist rectification of names, it is relatable to the Confucian tradition in which a promise or undertaking, especially in relation to a government aim, entails punishment or reward, though the tight, centralized control emphasized by the Han Feizi and predecessor Shen Buhai's conflicts with the Confucian idea of the autonomous minister.
Possibly referring to the drafting and imposition of laws and standardized legal terms, xing-ming may originally have meant "punishments and names", but with the emphasis on the latter. It functions through binding declarations (ming), like a legal contract. Verbally committing oneself, a candidate is allotted a job, indebting him to the ruler. "Naming" people to (objectively determined) positions, it rewards or punishes according to the proposed job description and whether the results fit the task entrusted by their word, which a real minister fulfils.
Han Fei insists on the perfect congruence between words and deeds. Fitting the name is more important than results. The completion, achievement, or result of a job is its assumption of a fixed form (xing), which can then be used as a standard against the original claim (ming). A large claim but a small achievement is inappropriate to the original verbal undertaking, while a larger achievement takes credit by overstepping the bounds of office.
Han Fei argues that a ruler should compare an official's claims with the duty assigned and the result actually achieved. A minister proposes an undertaking; the ruler gives that minister a corresponding responsibility, then evaluates the outcome against the proposal. A match between promise, office, and achievement merits reward, while a mismatch brings punishment. The point is to judge performance through stated responsibilities rather than relying on personal loyalty or reputation. This emphasis connects his discussion of political authority with practical problems of delegation and supervision.